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THE DILUTION EFFECT: FEDERALIZATION,
FAIR CROSS-SECTIONS, AND THE
CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY
Laura G. Dooley*
INTRODUCTION
The quintessential distinguishing feature of the American criminal
justice system is the jury. Juries representative of their communities
perform the interrelated functions in criminal trials of rendering ver-
dicts that reflect a sense of community justice and giving normative
content to law. When those functions are successfully performed, the
jury lends legitimacy to the criminal justice system, bolstering public
confidence in the extant rule of law.
Yet the criminal jury's validating functions are critically dependent
on its own legitimacy, which in turn requires an examination of two
key questions. First, what constitutes a "representative" jury, and sec-
ond, what is the relevant community the jury is supposed to re-
present? The first of these questions, grounded as it is in the Sixth
Amendment guarantee that a criminal defendant enjoys the right to
an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community,
has received a fair amount of attention from both courts and scholars.1
The second, arguably more profound and certainly prior question, has
remained largely unexamined. 2 The purpose of this Article is to fill
* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. I thank Amitai Etzioni, Stanley
Fish, and Ian Ayres for their kind and helpful comments on a previous draft, and my colleagues
at Valpo Law (particularly JoEllen Lind and Alex Geisinger) for their insights. Thanks also to
Michelle Dougherty, Kelly Hartzler, and Marissa Bracke for excellent research assistance, and to
the Law Library staff. The idea for this Article sprang from discussions with my colleague David
Vandercoy, an incredibly able lawyer whose work in criminal defense cases has given these issues
both depth and immediacy. It was his concern that his clients receive fair trials by juries com-
prised of a fair cross-section of their communities that prompted this Article, and I thank him
both for his unwavering support of this project and his devotion to the representation of those in
our society who most need it.
1. See, e.g., Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Representation,
and the Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93 (1996); Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting: Select-
ing Impartial Juries Through Community Representation, 52 VAND. L. REV. 353 (1999); Stanton
D. Krauss, Representing the Community: A Look at the Selection Process in Obscenity Cases and
Capital Sentencing, 64 IND. L.J. 617 (1989); Mitchell S. Zuklie, Comment, Rethinking the Fair
Cross-Section Requirement, 84 CAL. L. REV. 101 (1996).
2. There is some interesting literature on the so-called "vicinage" requirement-the rule em-
bodied in the Sixth Amendment that the accused enjoys the right to be tried "by an impartial
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that gap, and to do so using communitarian and postmodern theories
to explore the idea of community as it pertains to the composition of
juries.
The issues examined here are not, however, purely theoretical.
They have grave practical importance for criminal defendants facing
trial. Lawyers on both sides of criminal prosecutions have long tried
to manipulate the composition of juries in an effort to obtain
favorable results at trial. Devices like peremptory challenges and
change of venue motions are routinely used in these efforts, and the
strategic effects and constitutional implications of these are well-docu-
mented. But a new, subtler manipulation of the jury composition
scheme is emerging, one that makes the theoretical issues around the
concept of community immediate and compelling. Federal prosecu-
tors are taking control in increasing numbers of criminal prosecutions
previously within the purview of state prosecutors. This "federaliza-
tion" of so-called street crime, notably murders and robberies, has the
effect in most states of widening the "community" from which jurors
will be drawn from a county within a state to a federal district or divi-
sion encompassing several counties. A troubling second-order effect
of this practice, then, is to de-localize juries, often diluting any signifi-
cant minority representation. 3
A concrete example illustrates the problem and will provide a case
study for the analysis to follow. A robbery takes place in a gun store
located in an urban area with a high minority population. During the
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. See generally Steven A.
Engel, The Public's Vicinage Right: A Constitutional Argument, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1658 (2000)
(arguing that the public has a constitutional right to have criminal trials adjudicated locally).
Engel uses history and constitutional theory to make the case that the community which is ag-
grieved by the commission of a particular crime has a paramount, constitutionally protected
interest in being the venue for its prosecution. See generally id. He premises his argument on
the notion that legislatures (state and federal) are properly equipped to "define the vicinage
community" by drawing judicial districts. Id. at 1709. He does not address the question of
whether state or federal legislatively drawn boundaries adequately capture the community that
criminal juries should represent, particularly in larger federal districts. See also K. Winchester
Gaines, Race, Venue and the Rodney King Case: Can Batson Save the Vicinage Community?, 73
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 271 (1996); Drew L. Kershen, Vicinage, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 803 (1976).
Courts generally have operated on the assumption that the "community" for fair cross-section
purposes is adequately captured by political boundaries, state or federal. See, e.g., Davis v. War-
den, 867 F.2d 1003, 1009 (7th Cir. 1989) ("County lines or federal district lines do not magically
determine the parameters of a community. We believe, however, that because the decision is
somewhat arbitrary, it is a decision that should be left when possible to a body authorized to
legislate on such matters."); United States v. Grisham, 63 F.3d 1074, 1079 (11th Cir. 1995)
(though vicinage is a constitutional "constraint on the source of the jury ... the size of the
vicinage was left to Congressional determination.").
3. See infra Part II.C.
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course of the robbery, the gun shop owner is killed. A young African-
American man is arrested for the crime. The United States Attorney
decides to pursue a federal prosecution, basing federal jurisdiction on
criminal code provisions enacted by Congress under its Commerce
Clause powers, and seeks the death penalty under federal law. Be-
cause the federal district encompasses not just the urban county, but
also "collar" suburban counties, the jury pool from which the federal
jury will be drawn has a very different demographic makeup from one
that would be drawn, under state law, in a state prosecution within the
county where the crime took place. The wider reach of the federal
court means that the jury venire panel consists of many fewer minority
members, and the prospect that the defendants will face an all-white,
or nearly all-white, jury becomes much more likely.4
In the past thirty years, the Supreme Court has been forced to wres-
tle with difficult issues of race and the jury,5 and its two strands of
jurisprudence (one based on the fair cross-section requirement and
the other on the equal protection clause) have proven difficult to rec-
oncile. 6 The difficulty lies in the seeming inconsistency between the
fair cross-section requirement's privileging of juror diversity so that
differing perspectives are brought to the decisionmaking table and the
equal protection doctrine's rejection of stereotyping as predictive of
juror perspectives. Rather than mount another attempt to integrate
these competing constitutional principles into a coherent doctrine, this
article seeks to refocus the debate toward a more communitarian-
based view of the jury, using the federal versus state venire problem as
a lens.
The article thus proceeds in three major parts. Part II explains the
process by which juries are assembled in federal and state courts
under constitutional and statutory guidelines. 7 The relative geo-
4. A relatively old federal venue statute requires that capital cases be tried "in the county
where the offense was committed, where that can be done without great inconvenience." 18
U.S.C. § 3235 (2000). The section has been interpreted not to give defendants absolute rights to
trial in a certain county and to vest discretion in trial courts on the convenience question. See
Davis v. United States, 32 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1929); Brown v. United States, 257 F. 46, 48 (5th
Cir. 1919), rev'd on other grounds, 256 U.S. 335 (1921). In any event, this venue statute does not
affect the jury pool, which would still be determined according to the district's jury selection plan
on a district or division-wide basis, according to the vicinage requirement of the Sixth Amend-
ment. See infra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
5. See Andrew D. Leipold, Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in Criminal Cases: A Critical
Evaluation, 86 GEO. L.J. 945, 946-57 (1998) (describing the Supreme Court's relatively recent
interventions into jury selection procedures using the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section re-
quirement and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause).
6. See generally Muller, supra note 1.
7. See infra notes 14-65 and accompanying text.
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graphic spheres encompassed by state and federal jury pools will be
explored, using five metropolitan areas of varying populations around
the country8 as examples, with particular attention to the demographic
consequences of using either federal districts or state counties to de-
fine jury venire pools by reference to the latest census data. Part III
examines communitarian 9 and postmodern theory in an effort to de-
fine the relevant "communities" from which "fair" cross-sections can
be drawn to form politically legitimate juries.'0 In particular, the key
postmodern precept of constructed meaning has profound implica-
tions for the work of juries: when juries as collective democratic bod-
ies give content to legal norms, they form interpretive communities."
What gives a community coherence such that it can legitimately agree
on, and express through a jury, what constitutes, for example, "aggra-
vating" or "mitigating" circumstances that would warrant the imposi-
tion of a death sentence? Is that sort of coherence inherently local' 2
and therefore dissipated when one moves beyond fairly small geo-
graphic boundaries?
Finally, Part IV will synthesize the practice with the theory and con-
sider the implications of the federalization trend in criminal prosecu-
tions. 13 If relatively more of our criminal law is to be, in essence,
defined by federal as opposed to state juries, then it is essential that
we recognize this not just as a dilution of local power (a traditional
concern of federalism) but as an affront to the ideal of communitarian
justice embodied in the criminal jury.
8. The five areas, randomly chosen, are Los Angeles, California; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania;
Gary, Indiana; Detroit, Michigan; and Dallas, Texas.
9. "Communitarianism" has been described as
a social philosophy that maintains that societal formulations of the good are both
needed and legitimate. Communitarianism is often contrasted with classical liberalism,
a philosophical position that holds each individual should formulate the good. Com-
munitarians examine the way shared conceptions of the good (values) are formed,
transmitted, enforced and justified.
THE OXFORD COMPANION TO POLITICS OF THE WORLD 158 (Joel Krieger ed., 2d ed. 2001).
10. See infra notes 66-123 and accompanying text.
11. The concept of "interpretive communities" was first articulated by the literary-legal theo-
rist Stanley Fish to describe why language sometimes seems to have embedded meaning. See
generally STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE
COMMUNITIES (1980) and infra notes 111-123 and accompanying text. Compare the notion of
"communities of interest" developed in Supreme Court cases on legislative districting. See
Forde-Mazrui, supra note 1, at 382-88.
12. Fish argues repeatedly that it is, though not in this (jury) context.
13. See infra notes 124-170 and accompanying text.
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II. ASSEMBLING FEDERAL AND STATE JURY VENIRES
Jury panels are assembled in both state and federal courts against a
backdrop mosaic of constitutional, 14 statutory, and administrative law.
I thus begin my description with a short explanation of federal consti-
tutional requirements for the assembling of jury venire panels, re-
quirements that apply to all criminal jury panels in both state and
federal courts. I then move to an examination of the statutory and
administrative process used in federal court to assemble jury venires.
Finally, I describe the demographic consequences of drawing juries
from federal districts rather than state counties, using five sample met-
ropolitan areas to demonstrate the dilution effect of federal
districting.
A. Constitutional Requirements in the Assembly of
Jury Venire Panels
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
defendants charged with crimes the right to a trial by an "impartial"
jury.15 This guarantee has long been interpreted by the Supreme
Court to mean that juries must be drawn from a fair cross-section of
the community. 16 Enforcing this fair cross-section requirement has
engaged the courts in an evolving process, from early cases striking
down overt exclusions of distinct demographic groups (primarily those
based on gender and race) to later cases involving more subtle forms
of discrimination. All the cases make clear, however, that the Sixth
Amendment right to a fair cross-section applies only to the jury ve-
nire, 17 not to the actual "petit" jury panel that ends up serving in any
particular case.18
14. For state jury venires, both federal and state constitutional law will control the process.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
16. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 191 (1946).
17. Jury venire panels are typicaly assembled by clerks of court, who first develop a "source
list" for potential jurors-often by using voter rolls or driving records-and then use some ran-
dom method to choose which persons will actually be called for jury duty.
18. See, e.g., Ballard, 329 U.S. at 192-93 (quoting Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946)
(citations omitted)):
This does not mean, of course, that every jury must contain representatives of all the
economic, social, religious, racial, political, and geographical groups of the community;
frequently such complete representation would be impossible. But it does mean that
prospective jurors shall be selected by court officials without systematic and intentional
exclusion of any of these groups.
See also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) ("[Iln holding that petit juries must be
drawn from a source fairly representative of the community we impose no requirement that petit
juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in
the population."). As to the petit jury, the tool for inclusion of previously underrepresented
groups has been the Equal Protection Clause. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127,
20041
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The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has
also served as a check on racial discrimination in jury selection. Not
long after the post-Civil War amendments to the United States Consti-
tution were ratified, a case came to the Supreme Court on the issue of
whether an outright exclusion of African-American men from jury
service violated the new concept of "equal protection" under the law.
In Strauder v. West Virginia,19 the Supreme Court held that it did, a
holding that affects both the jury venire and the petit jury.20 Later,
the Court invoked the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth
Amendment to strike down both laws and practices that had the effect
of excluding African-Americans, 21 daily wage-earners, 22 Latinos, 23
and women 24 from jury service.
However, the systematic exclusion of women and racial minorities
from jury service persisted in some states well into the twentieth cen-
tury.25 The Supreme Court finally, and definitively, announced in the
1970s that schemes requiring women to affirmatively register their de-
sire to serve as jurors 26 or that granted automatic exemptions to
women summoned to serve27  violate the fair cross-section
requirement.
In Taylor v. Louisiana,28 the Supreme Court identified three pur-
poses served by the fair cross-section requirement: "[1] guard[ing]
against the exercise of arbitrary power [and invoking] the common-
sense judgment of the community as a hedge against the overzealous
or mistaken prosecutor ... [;] [2] [preserving] public confidence in the
fairness of the criminal justice system [; and] [3] sharing ... the admin-
146 (1994) (Batson rule extended to peremptory challenges based on gender); Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (Equal protection violated by use of peremptory challenges to
exclude prospective jurors solely on account of their race.).
19. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
20. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 479 (1990) ("[T]he Fourteenth Amendment's prohibi-
tion of unequal treatment in general and racial discrimination in particular .... therefore has
equal application at the petit jury and the venire stages ... .
21. See generally Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
22. See generally Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
23. See generally Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
24. See generally Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
25. For an argument that a correlation exists between the increasing inclusiveness of women
and minorities on juries and increasing limits on jury power on the civil side of the docket, see
Laura Gaston Dooley, Our Juries, Our Selves: The Power, Perception, and Politics of the Civil
Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 325 (1995)..
26. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (striking Louisiana's constitutional provi-
sion requiring women to file written declarations to serve on juries).
27. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 370 (1979) (striking Missouri practice of granting
women automatic exemptions from jury service).
28. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
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istration of justice [as] a phase of civic responsibility. ' 29 The Court
has extolled these functions as clear justifications for striking down
rules that overtly exclude racial minorities and women.30 Neverthe-
less, the Court has refused to find either fair cross-section or equal
protection violations in some cases in which statistical data demon-
strated gross underrepresentation of racial minorities in the jury pool.
Brown v. Alien31 involved the Alabama trial of an African-American
man for rape, which resulted in a conviction and death sentence. The
Supreme Court held that despite the gross underrepresentation of Af-
rican-Americans in the jury pool, 32 no Sixth Amendment violation ex-
isted given the efforts the county had made to increase the number of
African-Americans in the jury pool. 33 Some twelve years later, the
Supreme Court revisited the problem of race and juries in Alabama.
In Swain v. Alabama,34 the Court declared that "a defendant in a
criminal case is not constitutionally entitled to demand a proportion-
ate number of his race on the jury which tries him nor on the venire or
jury roll from which petit jurors are drawn."'35 Absent a showing of
purposeful discrimination against an identifiable group, the Court
held, a disparity of as much as 10% between a group's representation
in the jury pool and its representation in the general population does
not amount to an equal protection problem.
36
29. Id. at 530-31 (emphasis added) (quoting Thiel v. S. Pac., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting)).
30. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986). While refusing to recognize class of pro-
spective jurors opposed to the death penalty as a "distinctive group" for purposes of the fair
cross-section requirement, the Court noted that excluding
such groups as blacks .... women, .. . and Mexican-Americans .. .from jury service
clearly contravene[d] all three of the aforementioned purposes for the fair-cross-section
requirement. Because these groups [were] excluded for reasons completely unrelated
to the ability of members of the group to serve as jurors in a particular case, the exclu-
sion raise[s] at least the possibility that the composition of juries would be arbitrarily
skewed in such a way as to deny criminal defendants the benefit of the common-sense
judgment of the community.
Id. at 175.
31. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
32. The source list, comprised of all county property and poll taxpayers, included 16% Afri-
can-Americans, as compared to 33.5% African-Americans over twenty-one years of age in the
general population. Id. at 467-68. Of the sixty potential jurors called for the defendant's case,
five were African-American. Id. at 469.
33. The county had eliminated poll taxes, minimum property ownership requirements, and the
requirement that all taxes be paid for eligibility for jury service. Id. at 470.
34. 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled in part by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
35. Id. at 208.
36. Id. at 208-09. For an explanation of the statistical deficiencies in the Supreme Court's
analysis of the data presented in Swain, see Mark McGillis, Jury Venires: Eliminating the Dis-
crimination Factor by Using a Statistical Approach, 3 How. SCROLL 17, 31-33 (1995). Swain also
held that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective African-Ameri-
2004]
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The Supreme Court has subsequently settled on a three-part analy-
sis to ascertain whether a violation of the fair cross-section require-
ment has occurred:
the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded
is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation
of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and
reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the commu-
nity; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic ex-
clusion of the group in the jury-selection process.37
Lower courts have read the 10% criterion of Swain into the second
prong of the Duren analysis.38 In United States v. Phillips,39 for exam-
ple, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held
that a jury venire panel wholly devoid of African-Americans and His-
panics was not a Sixth Amendment problem when African-Americans
and Hispanics comprised only 6.1% of the population.40 Thus, in any
district or division that lacks a 10% minority population, a Sixth
Amendment fair cross-section claim could never be mounted, even in
the complete absence of minority representation in the jury pool.4 1
Defining the relevant scope of the community from which a fair
cross-section will be drawn, therefore, matters critically to the possi-
bility of genuine diversity on the jury. If minority communities tend
to be concentrated in particular geographic areas,4 2 smaller vicinage
districts are much more likely to capture a critical mass of minority
can jurors did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 380 U.S. at 226-27. This aspect of Swain
was overruled by the Court's decision in Batson, which now requires race-neutral use of peremp-
tory challenges. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986).
37. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
38. Swain was an equal protection case, but the test to state an equal protection claim for
minority underrepresentation in the jury pool generally mirrors the fair cross-section test. Id. at
371 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The difference is that equal protection claims require a showing
of intentional discrimination. Id.
39. 239 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 2001).
40. Id. at 841-42. The trial had taken place in the federal court in South Bend, Indiana.
41. This is known as the "absolute disparity" method for measuring underrepresentation, by
which "the percentage of representation of a distinct group on the venire is subtracted from the
percentage of representation of the group in the population as a whole." Ted M. Eades, Revisit-
ing the Jury System in Texas: A Study of the Jury Pool in Dallas County, 54 SMU L. REV. 1813,
1822 (2001). Though other statistical methods are used by some courts, most use the 10% floor
in both equal protection cases (which require a showing of intentional discrimination) and fair
cross-section cases. Id. at 1824. See also United States v. Grisham, 63 F.3d 1074, 1079 (11th Cir.
1995) (using absolute disparity analysis with the 10% rule); United States v. Weaver, 267 F.3d
231, 240-43 (3d Cir. 2001) (using absolute disparity analysis but without explicit use of the 10%
rule); United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648, 656 (2d Cir. 1996) (using absolute disparity analysis,
though noting its previous refusal to use absolute numbers in a case where evidence existed that
exclusion of minorities from jury pool was not benign).
42. See generally Nancy A. Denton, The Persistence of Segregation: Links Between Residential
Segregation and School Segregation, 80 MINN. L. REV. 795 (1996).
[Vol. 54:79
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presence. And this critical mass is essential to even trigger a fair
cross-section analysis under the Sixth Amendment.
B. Assembling the Jury Venire in Federal Court
With the constitutional backdrop explained above, we now turn to a
description of the process by which jury venire panels are actually as-
sembled in federal courts. Because a fairly elaborate statutory scheme
governs the process, there is some degree of uniformity amongst fed-
eral districts around the country with regard to jury selection. The
uniformity is imperfect, though, because the statute itself allows some
flexibility for local federal district courts in developing their jury selec-
tion plans to fit local conditions.
Before 1968, federal courts often used a "key man" method of as-
sembling a pool of prospective jurors.4 3 This method utilized well-
connected individuals or organizations to suggest citizens who, be-
cause of their esteem within the community, would make good jurors.
The obviously exclusionary character of this method finally led both
to a court decision striking it down44 and to a new statute designed to
produce a fairer cross-section of the community. The federal Jury Se-
lection Act,45 enacted by Congress in 1968, was designed to prevent
discrimination in jury service on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, or economic status.
46
The statute requires federal district courts to use lists of registered
or actual voters as their source lists or, if necessary "to foster the pol-
icy and protect the rights" identified by the statute, use some "other
source or sources of names."' 47 Some federal districts use district-wide
plans to draw jurors; others adopt separate plans for divisions or com-
bination of divisions within the judicial district.48 The statute specifi-
cally requires that the procedures contained in the jury plans of each
division or district "shall be designed to ensure the random selection
of a fair cross section of the persons residing in the community in the
district or division wherein the court convenes."' 49 Thus, the statute
43. JACK FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.10 (3d ed. 1999).
44. See Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34, 44 (5th Cir. 1966).
45. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1871 (2000).
46. See id. § 1862.
47. Id. § 1863(b)(2).
48. See id. § 1863(a) ("Separate plans may be adopted for each division or combination of
divisions within a judicial district.").
49. Id. § 1863(b)(3) (emphasis added). Further, the plan
shall ensure that names of persons residing in each of the counties, parishes, or similar
political subdivisions within the judicial district or division are placed in a master jury
wheel; and shall ensure that each county, parish, or similar political subdivision within
2004]
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explicitly defines the community from which a fair cross-section of ju-
rors is to be drawn as the entire federal district or division. In most
federal districts, this will be a multi-county area. 50
C. The Demographic Consequences of Assembling Juries in
Federal Versus State Courts
This section examines five sample metropolitan areas in an effort to
determine the demographic consequences of assembling juries in the
state courts, organized by county, as opposed to the federal courts,
organized by federal districts. In each of the five samples, metropoli-
tan areas are essentially comprised of a city that constitutes the major
population center of a county surrounded by suburban collar counties.
Census data demonstrate that the minority population is higher in the
urban county than it is in the suburban collar counties. 51 Thus, the
federal districts that are drawn to include the collar counties will di-
lute the minority representation in the jury pool for federal cases.52
For example, Indiana is divided into two federal judicial districts,
northern and southern.53 The northern district is then subdivided into
three divisions, one of which is the Hammond Division.54 Lake
County, in the Hammond division, is where the city of Gary is located,
and has a large minority population. The surrounding counties are
overwhelmingly white. Thus, moving beyond Lake County to draw a
the district or division is substantially proportionally represented in the master jury
wheel for that judicial district, division, or combination of divisions.
Id.
50. See, e.g., infra Part II.C (describing demographics of federal districts in five sample metro-
politan areas). See also Rose Jade, Oregon Jury Pools: Who Are These People and Where Did
They Come From?, OR. ST. B. BULL, May 1999, at 19, 19; Steve Malin, Litigating Intellectual
Property Disputes in Texas State Court, 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 473, 496 (2004) ("Cases in
Texas state court draw venire from the county in which the court sits; federal courts, on the other
hand, draw jurors from multiple counties within that court's district and division."); Robert B.
Hemley & Carol L. Shea, Dispelling Myths: The Differences Between Federal and State Court,
VT. B.J., Winter 2003-2004, at 31, 31. ("The jury pool for federal cases draws from multiple
counties.").
51. When using census data to determine representativeness on jury venire panels, the analy-
sis is necessarily imprecise because the census does not measure the jury-eligible population.
Thus, courts are forced to do a crude comparison between the percentage of a minority group in
the population base and the percentage of that group in the jury pool. See Eades, supra note 41,
at 1823 (Though some courts have objected, the Supreme Court uses general census data in jury
representativeness cases, and census information "is the most accurate, readily available source
of data.").
52. See infra Appendix A for a graphic representation of the census data.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 94 (2000).
54. Id. The Hammond Division is comprised of the counties of Benton, Carroll, Jasper, Lake,
Newton, Porter, Tippecanoe, Warren, and White. Id. The Hammond Division holds court in
Hammond, with jurors drawn from Lake and Porter counties, and in Lafayette, with jurors
drawn from the other counties.
[Vol. 54:79
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jury pool for federal court cases inevitably dilutes minority represen-
tation. While the African-American population of Lake County is
25.3%, blacks are only 19.7% of the Hammond division because of
the addition of virtually all-white Porter County.55 Moreover, the di-
lution effect may be exacerbated by intra-district transfers, which are
not a fair cross-section problem because the statute defines the com-
munity by district or division. 56 When a case is transferred from the
Hammond division, for example, to the South Bend division, juries
will be drawn from a division in which only 6.1% of the population is
African-American. 57
The demographics in the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania area are even
starker. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which is the federal dis-
trict encompassing the city of Philadelphia and its namesake county, is
comprised of eight additional collar counties. The federal court uses
voter registration lists to assemble its jury pool; the state courts in
Philadelphia County use both voter and drivers' registration lists.58
The percentage of African-Americans in Philadelphia County is
43.2%; 59 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, that number drops to
16.8% .60
A similar phenomenon exists in the Detroit metropolitan area. The
city is located in Wayne County, which has a 42.2% black popula-
55. See U.S. Census Bureau, Profile of General Demographic Characteristics: 2000, tbl. DP-1
(Porter County, Ind.), available at http://censtats.census.gov/dataIIN/05018127.pdf [hereinafter
tbl. DP-1 (county, state)].
56. See Davis v. Warden, 867 F.2d 1003, 1008 (7th Cir. 1989).
According to the Supreme Court, the sixth amendment entitles a defendant to a jury
drawn from the federal district in which the crime was committed, although the jury
may be drawn from a division of the district rather than the entire district. Lower
courts have held therefore that a jury selection system satisfies the sixth amendment if
the jury is selected from either the entire district or a division of that district.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
57. See United States v. Phillips, 239 F.3d 829, 841-42 (7th Cir. 2001).
58. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4521(a) (2003).
59. Tbl. DP-1 (Philadelphia County, Pa.) supra note 55, available at http://censtats.census.gov/
data/PA/05042101.pdf.
60. The percentage of African-Americans in the federal district was calculated using the cen-
sus data from each of its constituent counties (Berks, Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Lancaster, Le-
high, Montgomery, Northampton, and Philadelphia counties). Thl. DP-1 (Berks County, Pa.),
supra note 55, available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/PA/05042011.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Bucks
County, Pa.), available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/PA/05042017.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Chester
County, Pa.), available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/PA/05042029.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Delaware
County, Pa.), available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/PA/05042045.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Lancaster
County, Pa.). available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/PA/05042071.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Lehigh
County, Pa.), available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/PA/05042077.pdf; tbi. DP-1 (Montgom-
ery County, Pa.), available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/PA/05042091.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (North-
ampton County, Pa.), available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/PA/05042095.pdf; tbl. DP-1
(Philadelphia County, Pa.), available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/PA/05042101.pdf.
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tion.61 The Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, encom-
passes Wayne County along with eight other counties, yielding a
21.5% overall African-American population.62 Significantly, the State
of Michigan does not have a death penalty.63 Thus, the federalization
of murder trials in Michigan makes the death penalty available at the
same time that it dilutes minority representation in the jury pool.
In the Los Angeles and Dallas areas, the story is an interesting re-
flection of the changing demographics in America generally. In both
metro areas, the Hispanic population is larger than other minority
groups.64 And in both areas, the proportion of both Hispanic and Af-
rican-American populations gets diluted by federal divisions that in-
clude suburban counties along with the county in which each city is
located, though the disparity is not as great as in Philadelphia or
Detroit.65
61. See tbl. DP-1 (Wayne County, Mich.), supra note 55, available at http://censtats.census.gov/
data/MI/05026163.pdf.
62. This percentage was calculated using the data from counties within the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division (Jackson, Lenawee, Macomb, Monroe, Oakland, St. Clair, Sanilac,
Washetenaw, Wayne). See tbl. DP-1 (Jackson County, Mich.), available at http://censtats.census.
gov/data/Ml/05026075.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Lenaweee County, Mich.), available at http://censtats.cen-
sus.gov/data/MI/05026091.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Macomb County, Mich.), available at http://censtats.
census.gov/data/Ml/05026099.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Monroe County, Mich.), available at http://censtats.
census.gov/data/Ml/05026115.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Oakland County, Mich.), available at http://censtats.
census.gov/data/MI/05026125.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (St. Clair County, Mich.), available at http://censtats.
census.gov/data/MI/05026147.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Sanilac County, Mich.), available at http://censtats.
census.gov/data/Ml/05026151.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Washtenaw County, Mich.), available at http://cen-
stats.census.gov/data/MI/05026161.pdf tbl. DP-1 (Wayne County, Mich.), available at http://cen-
stats.census.gov/data/Ml/05026163.pdf.
63. MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 46 (declaring that "[n]o law shall be enacted providing for the
penalty of death").
64. See tbl. DP-1, (Los Angeles County, Cal.), supra note 59, available at http://censtats.cen-
sus.gov/data/CA/05006037.pdf (showing 44.6% "Hispanic or Latino (of any race)"); tbl. DP-1
(Dallas, Tex.), available at http://censtats.census.gov/data[TX/05048113.pdf (showing 29.9%
"Hispanic or Latino (of any race)").
65. In California, the proportion of African-Americans in Los Angeles County is 9.8% versus
8.8% in the Central federal district, western division, which encompasses Los Angeles, San Luis
Obispo, Santa Barbara, and Ventura Counties. Thl. DP-1 (Los Angeles County, Cal.), supra
note 55, available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/CA/05006037.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (San Luis Obispo
County, Cal.), available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/CA/05006079.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Santa
Barbara County, Cal.), available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/CA/05006083.pdf; tbl. DP-1
(Ventura County, Cal.), available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/CA/05006111.pdf. The pro-
portion of Hispanics in Los Angeles County is 44.6%, as opposed to 42.8% in the federal divi-
sion. Thl. DP-1 (Los Angeles County, Cal.), available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/CA/
05006037.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (San Luis Obispo County, Cal.), available at http://censtats.census.gov/
data/CA/05006079.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Santa Barbara County, Cal.), available at http://censtats.cen-
sus.gov/data/CA/05006083.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Ventura County, Cal.), available at http://censtats.cen-
sus.gov/data/CAI05006111.pdf. In Texas, Dallas County has 20.3% African-Americans and
29.9% Hispanics as opposed to the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, which has 18.1%
African-Americans and 26.9% Hispanics because it incorporates six additional counties. Thl.
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III. DEFINING THE RELEVANT COMMUNITY:
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
The demonstration that the demographic makeup of the jury venire
pool will vary in state and federal court, at least in the five sample
districts examined, pushes toward a fundamental question: what is the
relevant community from which the "fair cross-section" of jurors
should be drawn? Both state counties and federal districts are politi-
cal subdivisions, drawn by historical accidents or political expedien-
cies. But does either geographically-defined space capture the sort of
coherence that could fairly be said to constitute community in a more
meaningful sense of the word? I look now to two distinctive theoreti-
cal schools in an effort to give content to the concept of "community"
as used in the fair cross-section context. The first is the communitar-
ian movement, whose agenda has been most famously articulated by
sociologist Amitai Etzioni.66 The second is the postmodern linguistic
theory of "interpretive communities," an idea championed by literary
and legal scholar Stanley Fish.67
A. Communitarian Theory
In his book, The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a
Democratic Society,6 8 Amitai Etzioni69 makes a powerful case for the
importance of a core of shared values 70 in defining moral order. This
"core of shared values" enables a community "to formulate specific
public policies ... [by providing] criteria for settling differences in a
DP-1 (Dallas, Tex.), available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/TX/05048113.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Ellis
County, Tex.), available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/TX05048139.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Hunt
County, Tex.), available at http://censtats.census.gov/dataTX/05048231.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Johnson
County, Tex.), available at http://censtats.census.gov/dataITX/05048251.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Kaufman
County, Tex.), available at http://censtats.census.gov/dataTX/05048257.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Navarro
County, Tex.), available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/TX/05048349.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Rockwall
County, Tex.), available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/TX/05048397.pdf.
66. See infra notes 68-74, 106-110, 150, 154 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 11-12 and infra notes 111-123 and accompanying text.
68. AMITAI ETZIONI, THE NEW GOLDEN RULE: COMMUNITY AND MORALITY IN A DEMO-
CRATIC SOCIETY (1996).
69. Etzioni, University Professor at George Washington University, is the founding president
of the Communitarian Network and the editor of The Responsive Community, a widely-distrib-
uted newsletter. He is one of the premier voices in the communitarian movement.
70. ETZIONI, supra note 68, at 85.
Shared values are values to which most members of the society are committed (albeit
not necessarily to the same extent). Shared values differ profoundly from agreed posi-
tions, which are the results of some procedure, such as negotiated contracts or arbitra-
tion, and are reached on practical or tactical grounds-an accommodation by
individuals who have different values.
Id. at 85-86.
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principled rather than an ad hoc or interest-based manner."'71 The
problem, of course, is the tension inherent in a pluralistic society such
as the United States between these "shared core values" and the no-
tion of a liberal state fueled by individual freedoms. Much of Et-
zioni's book is devoted to the ongoing debates between liberals and
communitarians as to the shifting contours of individual freedom and
autonomy in contraposition to the concept of the common good.
Moreover, communitarian thinkers make "clear that communal values
must be judged by external and overriding criteria, based on shared
human experience. '72 But rather than focusing on the imposition of
values on some pre-existing group (geographical or otherwise) of peo-
ple, communitarian theory posits that the values themselves actually
help to define the community.73 Thus, there is always a complex
symbiotic interplay between any moral decisionmaker, including a ju-
ror, and her community: the community shapes her values just as her
values shape her community.74
At this point one confronts the problem of levels of generality. If
values rather than geography are a better determinant of community,
then at what level of specificity should the values be articulated?
Michael J. Perry, after affirming that "moral deliberation requires
community" 75 (in the context of constitutional interpretation) argues
that there exists a national "judging community" at the level of gener-
ally shared ideals like freedom of speech and religion, due process of
law and equal protection. 76 Because those ideals are by nature "un-
derdeterminate," 77 they are directly useful in situations that test the
core of the principle of each 78 and indirectly useful as tools to mediate
consensus and dissensus. 79 But when decisionmakers are faced with
the task of answering a particular question, as jurors in criminal trials
always are, this broad notion of community may well break down. As
71. Id. at 87.
72. See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE
COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA 255 (1993).
73. "The starting point, typically, is shared values, not individual choices or formulations of
the good." ETZIONI, supra note 68, at 93.
74. ETZIONI, supra note 72, at 31 ("[W]e find reinforcement for our moral inclinations and
provide reinforcement to our fellow human beings, through the community.").
75. MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW: A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY 157 (1988).
76. Id. at 154.
77. Id. at 155.
78. Id. at 155-56. For example, there would likely be "virtual consensus" as to whether the
government could compel allegiance to a particular religion. Id. at 155.
79. Id. at 156. For example, the shared ideal would give decisionmakers a point of reference
to decide whether a particular policy violates the core principle. PERRY, supra note 75, at 158.
Perry argues that constitutional discourse, in nonoriginalist constitutional adjudication, is "at its
idealized best,... the moral discourse of the constitutional community." Id. at 158.
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jurors struggle with difficult moral decisionmaking (constrained only
loosely by the judge's instructions on the relevant law), the relevant
communities that shape the values brought to the deliberation table
cannot be so broadly defined. 80
Indeed, communitarianism has been criticized for its failure to de-
fine what constitutes a community for the purpose of deliberating
moral or societal questions. 81 Modern life is organized such that most
people identify with many more than one community. 82 Daniel Bell
describes the communities that matter for moral deliberation as those
that constitute identity, and then proposes criteria "for distinguishing
constitutive communities from other forms of association, contingent
attachments, fleeting 'facts' about oneself, and so on."' 83 Significantly,
constitutive communities are revealed by their members' self-defini-
tion and are aspects of their identities that "can't be shed like mem-
bership of a voluntary association. ' 84 And the values of those
constitutive communities inform, in a way that is both subtle and
sometimes dimly perceived even by the member herself, every act of
moral deliberation. 85 Bell identifies three kinds of constitutive com-
munities: communities of place, of memory (that is, a shared history),
80. "'[Wlhich community is appealed to for the intersubjective criteria or grounds of
judgment, since the latter will vary as one varies the community appealed to ...
[W]here allegiances conflict, it is not decided in advance which community will supply
the basis of judgment. Does my commitment to a particular people outweigh, or is it
outweighed by, my commitment to' some other group? '[I]t [is not] immediately appar-
ent to whom the judgment is addressed: a community of the past or one projected into
the future; a particular national community or a community of nations; a tiny circle or
associates or universal mankind .... Thus, the claim-judgment implies judging com-
munity-gives rise to the question: which community?"'
PERRY, supra note 75, at 157-58 (quoting D. TRACY, PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY 142-43, 146
(1987)) (passages rearranged).
81. See DANIEL BELL, COMMUNITARIANISM AND ITS CRITICS 91 (1993) ("[E]veryone knows
that communitarians place special emphasis upon communal life, but few have a clear grasp of
what sort of community we are to value."). Bell's book is written in the form of a two-character
play, in the manner of the movie My Dinner with Andre. Both characters are graduate philoso-
phy students; over dinner and wine in a Paris restaurant, the character Anne describes her doc-
toral thesis, which is a defense of communitarianism, against the character Philip's various
critiques.
82. German sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies, in the nineteenth century, described what he
called gemeinschaft as an ideal of a local community that is static, orderly, and intimate in con-
trast to gesellschaft, the modern large-scale society of individuals who form associations only for
instrumental reasons. See generally FERDINAND TONNIES, COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY (Charles
P. Loomis trans., Harper & Row 1963) (1887); see also BELL, supra note 81, at 90-91. Modern
communitarian thinkers reject such a strict dichotomy, recognizing that it is possible for people
to function in our modern large-scale society and still be part of constitutive communities. Id. at
91.
83. Id. at 94.
84. Id. at 95.
85. See id. at 103.
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and of "face to face personal interaction governed by sentiments of
trust, co-operation, and altruism. '86 Thus, the work of moral decision-
making, which is the key task performed by juries, is informed by the
jurors' constitutive communities-defined geographically, by shared
histories, and, most significantly, by the sort of face-to-face personal
interactions that demand both value expression and accountability. 87
This suggests that relatively smaller community boundaries, where re-
peated interpersonal interactions are more likely to take place, better
capture the idea of community that would most matter for moral deci-
sionmaking, including that done by juries.
The idea that local communities have intrinsic value that is endan-
gered by modern industrial and transient societal trends is not new.
Early in the twentieth century, Progressive philosopher John Dewey
described the corrupting influence of technology on the preexisting
local communities of the day, noting that "the machine age in devel-
oping the Great Society has invaded and partially disintegrated the
small communities of former times without generating a Great Com-
munity. ' 88 Dewey worried that the loss of those smaller communities
would portend a diminishment of American democracy, because he
considered "genuine community life"-that is, a common identity-to
be necessary to effective self-governance. 89
At the turn of the twenty-first century, Robert D. Putnam famously
described a similar phenomenon-that is, a loss of what he calls "so-
cial capital"-as "bowling alone." 90 In his book, Bowling Alone, Put-
[T]hree criteria [are] employed to distinguish 'constitutive communities' from contin-
gent attachments .... One should start with how it is that people in fact define them-
selves, i.e. how they answer the question 'who are you?' Next ... a constitutive
community provides a largely background way of meaningful thinking, acting, and
judging. The last criterion [is that] one loses a commitment to a constitutive community
at the price of being thrown into a state of severe disorientation where one is unable to
take a stand on many things of significance.
Id.
86. BELL, supra note 81, at 185.
87. Id.
88. JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS (1926), reprinted in 2 THE LATER WORKS
OF JOHN DEWEY, 1925-1953, at 314 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1984), quoted in MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 208 (1996).
89. Id.
90. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY (2000).
[S]ocial capital refers to connections among individuals-social networks and the
norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them. In that sense social
capital is closely related to what some have called "civic virtue." The difference is that
"social capital" calls attention to the fact that civic virtue is most powerful when em-
bedded in a dense network of reciprocal social relations.
Id. at 19.
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nam describes the waning participation of Americans in both formal
and informal social institutions, using the decline of league bowling as
a symbolic example. 91 While the general theme of Putnam's book is
that Americans desperately need to recapture a sense of community, 92
he pointedly avoids nostalgic visions of a past "golden age" by noting
both that social capital can have seriously negative externalities for
those outside the community 93 and that debates over the loss of com-
munity are nothing new in American intellectual life. 94 Indeed, Put-
nam's thesis is not that community bonds have been in steady decline,
but that the story of American civic engagement is one of both "col-
lapse and renewal. '95
Putnam's book is empirically based on the study of a rich collection
of survey data, rendering insights that have at least two important im-
plications for our project of defining community in the context of the
fair cross-section requirement. First, the data demonstrate that the
size of the community makes a difference in terms of civic engage-
ment.96 Second, there is apparently a generational shift in the way
that the concept of community is understood by Americans.97
When early Progressive thinkers worried over the loss of commu-
nity, they in part manifested a privileging of the small town over what
was described (often quite accurately) as urban squalor.98 Dewey and
others believed that the connectedness of relationships in smaller
communities led to a better quality of democracy. 99 Putnam's study of
recent data seems to bear out the early reformers' intuition that the
91. Id. at 111-13.
92. See, e.g., id. at 28 ("[W]e Americans need to reconnect with one another. That is the
simple argument of this book.").
93. Putnam notes that like other forms of capital, social capital "can be directed toward ma-
levolent, antisocial purposes .... Therefore it is important to ask how the positive consequences
of social capital-mutual support, cooperation, trust, institutional effectiveness-can be maxi-
mized and the negative manifestations-sectarianism, ethnocentrism, corruption-minimized."
Id. at 22.
94. "Debates about the waxing and waning of 'community' have been endemic for at least two
centuries .... We seem perennially tempted to contrast our tawdry todays with past golden
ages." Id. at 24.
95. PUTNAM, supra note 90, at 25.
96. Id. at 119.
97. Id. at 274-75.
98. Id. at 378-79.
99. Id. at 377-80. These communitarian Progressives were not necessarily pessimistic about
the possibility of civic engagement in larger settings, however: "As historian Quandt describes
the optimistic outlook of these reformers, 'The easy sense of belonging, the similarity of experi-
ence, and the ethic of participation might be more easily maintained in the small locality than
anywhere else, but this did not preclude their cultivation in different soil."' Id. at 380 (quoting
JEAN QUANDT, FROM THE SMALL TowN TO THE GREAT COMMUNITY: THE SOCIAL THOUGHT
OF PROGRESSIVE INTELLECTUALS 10 (1970)).
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size of the community makes a difference in civic engagement: "for-
mal volunteering, working on community projects, informal helping
behavior (like coming to the aid of a stranger), charitable giving, and
perhaps blood donation are all more common in small towns than in
big cities."100 This supports the common-sense intuition that the
smaller the community, the more cohesive its ties, and, presumably, its
values-or, conversely, that as community boundaries are drawn more
broadly, values are less likely to be shared.
A second important insight of Putnam's study shows a generational
divide on civic engagement. He found that people born before 1946
were "nearly twice as likely to feel a sense of belonging to their neigh-
borhood, to their church, to their local community, and to the various
groups and organizations to which they belong" as Generation X'ers
born after 1964. 11 Interestingly, though both groups were intimately
tied to their families and friends, the younger generation was mark-
edly less engaged with their local communities.10 2 Putnam struggles
with possible explanations for the generational difference, noting the
near-impossibility of sorting cause from effect in this complicated con-
text. 10 3 Without reaching any definite conclusion, Putnam is dismis-
sive of the possibility that the rise of "big government" is somehow a
causative factor in the decline in civic engagement. 10 4 But in the par-
ticular context of the jury, it is worth exploring the possibility that as
the jury pool widens, the potential for genuine community input into
jury decisionmaking declines. For as the "community" represented by
the jury is enlarged, the probability of cohesive values that might bind
jurors together is lessened. Thus, the enlargement of the jury pool (by
federalizing) has the effect of diluting community values. This, in
turn, may well produce the second-order effect of rendering public
sentiment that is at best dismissive of, and at worst disdainful of, jury
service.
This is not to say that the only places in which community-wide val-
ues can be cultivated must, necessarily, have small populations. Soci-
ologist Herbert Gans has described "urban villages" within large cities
like Boston and New York, where people of various ethnic groups live
together, know each other and their local merchants, and look out for
100. PUTNAM, supra note 90, at 119. For more data on the impact of community size on
altruism, see id. at 463 (listing references for Chapter 7 of Putnam's book entitled "Altruism,
Volunteering, and Philanthropy").
101. Id. at 274-75. Baby boomers fell midway between those two groups. Id. at 275.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 277-84.
104. PUTNAM, supra note 90, at 281-82.
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each others' safety and children.10 5 Nor does this argument lead to a
call for return to the smaller, traditional communities of yesteryear
(which tended toward complete homogeneity and, often, rigid author-
itarianism).10 6 Rather, as Etzioni argues, "[w]hat we need now are
communities that balance both diversity and unity ...we need to
strengthen the communitarian elements in the urban and suburban
centers, to provide the social bonds that sustain the moral voice, but at
the same time avoid tight networks that suppress pluralism and
dissent." 107
In an effort to sketch the communitarian agenda, Etzioni has
drafted a document called The Responsive Communitarian Platform:
Rights and Responsibilities.10 8 One point made in the platform is that
communities are weakened when tasks they should rightfully perform
are usurped by larger institutions: "Generally, no social task should be
assigned to an institution that is larger than necessary to do the job
.... What can be done at the local level should not be passed on to
the state or federal level[.] ' 10 9 The platform then articulates duties
that communities should expect from their members, notably voting
and jury service."10
B. Postmodern Theory: The Interpretive Community
In his famous book Is There a Text in this Class?,' literary theorist
Stanley Fish took on the conundrum that was the raging debate in
literary circles of the time: does meaning reside in the text or is it
105. See HERBERT J. GANS, THE URBAN VILLAGERS: GROUP AND CLASS IN THE LIFE OF
ITALIAN-AMERICANS 14-15 (1982); see also JIM SLEEPER, CLOSEST OF STRANGERS: LIBERALISM
AND THE POLITICS OF RACE IN NEW YORK (1990), cited in ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY,
supra note 72, at 120. Daniel Bell makes a similar point: in refuting the argument that people
are less "determined by, and attached to, their home if they're from the large cities of contempo-
rary society than if they were born and bred in the small communities of the past," Bell's com-
munitarian character Anne asks: "Have you seen any Woody Allen films? Do you not think that
New York is constitutive of Woody Allen's identity?" BELL, supra note 81, at 105-06.
106. See ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY, supra note 72, at 122.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 251-67. As the author explains, the platform was first drafted by Etzioni himself,
and was later significantly edited and rewritten by a large number of others, including Mary Ann
Glendon and William Galston. It was eventually endorsed by seventy leading Americans, both
conservative and liberal. Id. at 251.
109. Id. at 260.
110. Id. at 261. Elsewhere in his book, Etzioni describes communities as "Chinese nesting
boxes, in which less encompassing communities (families, neighborhoods) are nestled within
more encompassing ones (local villages and towns), which in turn are situated within still more
encompassing communities, the national and cross-national ones." ETZIONi, supra note 72, at
32. He also notes that some communities, like professional or work-based ones, are not geo-
graphically based. Id.
111. FISH, supra note 11.
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constructed by the reader of the text? Choosing either of those op-
tions was problematic: if the text had determinate meaning, then how
to explain disagreement? But if individual readers determined the
meaning so that a text's meaning varies with each reader, then how to
explain agreement? Fish sought an explanation accounting for both
agreement and disagreement, and thus set out to answer how a
postmodernist like himself who "preach[ed] the instability of the text
and the unavailability of determinate meanings"' 112 could explain how
different people could find the same meaning in a given text. 113 He
did so by articulating the concept of the "interpretive community,"
which he later described as:
[N]ot so much a group of individuals who shared a point of view,
but a point of view or way of organizing experience that shared indi-
viduals in the sense that its assumed distinctions, categories of un-
derstanding, and stipulations of relevance and irrelevance were the
content of the consciousness of community members who were
therefore no longer individuals, but, insofar as they were embedded
in the community's enterprise, community property ... such com-
munity-constituted interpreters would, in their turn, constitute,
more or less in agreement, the same text, although the sameness
would not be attributable to the self-identity of the text, but to the
communal nature of the interpretive act. 114
Fish's idea of the interpretive community thus suggests that peo-
ples' understanding of texts, and indeed of facts, 115 and presumably of
norms, is constructed by the communities of which they are a part. He
is careful to distinguish this view from subjectivity or relativism: it is
not relativistic because "a shared basis of agreement at once guid[es]
interpretation and provid[es] a mechanism for deciding between inter-
pretations;" 116 it is not subjective because the interpretive strategies
112. Id. at 305.
113. Or explain, for that matter, how meaningful human communication could ever occur.
See id. at 303-04.
114. STANLEY F. FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE
PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 141 (1989) [hereinafter DOING WHAT
COMES NATURALLY].
115. Disagreements cannot be resolved by reference to the facts, because the facts
emerge only in the context of some point of view ... disagreements must occur be-
tween those who hold (or are held by) different points of view, and what is at stake in a
disagreement is the right to specify what the facts can hereafter be said to be. Dis-
agreements are not settled by the facts, but are the means by which the facts are settled.
FISH, supra note 11, at 338.
116. Id. at 317. Indeed, Fish argues that:
[N]o one can be a relativist, because no one can achieve the distance from his own
beliefs and assumptions which would result in their being no more authoritative for him
than the beliefs and assumptions held by others, or, for that matter, the beliefs and
assumptions he himself used to hold.
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by which meanings are constructed are "social and conventional. 1 17
Moreover, Fish characterizes interpretive communities as "engines of
change because [their] assumptions are not a mechanism for shutting
out the world but for organizing it, for seeing phenomena as already
related to the interests and goals that make the community what it
is.'118 And though persons within interpretive communities are not
free agents, since their interpretive assumptions and strategies are a
product of the community of which they are a part, neither are their
ideas (nor those of their communities) fixed or immutable. Rather,
both the members and their interpretive communities are constantly
evolving, in an ongoing project that is "at the same time assimilative
and self-transforming."11 9
Later in his career, Fish explicitly applied his ideas about literary
interpretation to law. In a series of essays framed as debates between
Fish and the leading legal theorists of the day, 20 Fish exported the
central problem of literary theory-that is, what is the source of inter-
pretive authority, the text or the reader-to the context of legal inter-
pretation. In particular, he focused on the process of judging: as
judges make decisions, they must use texts in the form of both prece-
dents and statutes. 12' In these essays, Fish continued to argue that
legal interpreters (that is, judges) are neither constrained by embed-
ded meaning in the text nor wholly free to imbue the text with
whatever meaning they might choose. Rather,
[i]nterpreters are constrained by their tacit awareness of what is
possible and not possible to do, what is and is not a reasonable thing
to say, what will and will not be heard as evidence, in a given enter-
prise; and it is within those same constraints that they see and bring
others to see the shape of the documents to whose interpretation
they are committed.122
Id. at 319. Interpreters do not, and in fact cannot, act on their own; they are "extensions of an
institutional community [and thus] solipsism and relativism are removed as fears because they
are not possible modes of being." Id. at 321.
117. Id. at 331 ("[Tlhe 'you' who does the interpretative work ... is a communal you and not
an isolated individual.").
118. STANLEY FISH, Change, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 114, at 150.
119. Id. at 152.
120. See STANLEY FISH, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, in
DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 114, at 87-102 (debate between Fish and Ronald
Dworkin); STANLEY FISH, Fish v. Fiss, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 114, at
120-40 (debate between Fish and Owen Fiss); STANLEY FISH, Don't Know Much About the
Middle Ages: Posner on Law and Literature, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note
114, at 294-311 (debate between Fish and Richard Posner).
121. See generally FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 114.
122. STANLEY FISH, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, in Do-
ING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 114, at 98 (in response to Dworkin). See also
STANLY FISH, Fish v. Fiss, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 114, at 126 (in
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Fish's notions that the law, as any other text, cannot and does not
operate as a self-executing constraint in the process of judging and
that interpretations are the product of community-based understand-
ings and assumptions have important implications for the work of ju-
ries. Indeed, juries may be understood to be an artificially-created
interpretive community, 123 formed in a particular case to construct a
factual history and then to render its legal meaning. The work of ju-
ries throughout a trial is interpretation in the sense Fish describes: the
texts to be interpreted are presented in formats both evidentiary (doc-
umentary and testimonial) and instructive (jury instructions on the
law). Thus, when a jury is required to decide whether conduct is "neg-
ligent" or "reckless" or, in a death penalty case, whether there are
"mitigating" or "aggravating" circumstances, its decision is the culmi-
nation of a series of interpretive acts. And those acts are not just the
sum of the individual responses of the twelve jurors involved to the
evidence presented and the instructions given, but in a larger sense
are the product of the embedded understandings and assumptions of
the interpretive communities of which those jurors are a part.
IV. SYNTHESIZING THEORY AND PRACTICE:
WHY COMMUNITY MATTERS
In this section, I consider the implications of the theoretical prob-
lem of defining the relevant community from which a fair cross-sec-
tion of jurors must be drawn in light of the very practical reality that
much more of our criminal law is now being prosecuted at the federal
level. I turn first to a description of this federalization trend and then
to an analysis of its effect given the demographic data presented ear-
lier, in light of the communitarian and postmodern theory. Finally, I
return to our case study of the inner-city murder scenario as an illus-
tration of why the notion of the relevant "community" might indeed
make a very real difference.
response to Fiss: neither the text nor "disciplining rules" can operate as a constraint on interpre-
tation, and the "fear of unbridled interpretation-of interpreters whose determinations of mean-
ing are unconstrained-is baseless.").
123. This is not to say that because it is artificially created that the jury is some sort of new or
freestanding interpretive community. Central to Fish's argument is the notion that one cannot
extricate oneself from the embedded assumptions and understandings that inform one's inter-
pretations. Thus, jurors could never come to a jury room as blank slates to form a new interpre-
tive community divorced from their previous social contexts. But this, of course, supports my
argument: it is precisely because jurors bring their pre-existing "interpretive communities" with
them to the jury room that their role in establishing and confirming social norms is so important.
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A. The Federalization of Street Crime
In 1997, the American Bar Association (ABA) formed a task force
to examine the federalization trend in criminal law. 124 The ABA Task
Force, chaired by former Attorney General Edwin Meese, a25 docu-
mented that the trend exists and characterized it negatively, as "inap-
propriate federalization."'126
The ABA Task Force began its report by tracing the history of fed-
eral criminal law. In the early years of the Republic, the federal gov-
ernment had jurisdiction to prosecute very few crimes, 127 all of which
had to do with harm done to the federal government itself.128 The
states exercised virtually exclusive control over criminal enforcement,
largely because crime was viewed as "a uniquely local concern.
129
The federal government made its first forays into what had previously
been viewed as subjects within the states' police powers in the years
following the Civil War.130 Notably, Congress located its constitu-
tional power to reach crime formerly within the states' exclusive pur-
view in the Commerce Clause.131 Given the rapid technological
change of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the in-
creasing movement of people, goods and services in interstate com-
merce became a justification for federal intrusion into the criminal law
via the Commerce Clause. The movement toward federalization ac-
celerated during the New Deal years and beyond; indeed, today there
are more than 3,000 federal crimes.' 32 The ABA Task Force further
124. See James A. Strazzella, The Federalization of Criminal Law, 1998 A.B.A. CRIM. JUST.
SEC. TASKFORCE.
125. Membership in the task force included judges, former members of Congress, former
United States Attorneys, academics, law enforcement personnel, and private practitioners. See
id. at 261 app. D.
126. Id. at 45.
127. See Kathleen F. Brickey, The Commerce Clause and Federalized Crime: A Tale of Two
Thieves, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 27, 28 (1996) ("[Seventeen] crimes ...
formed the entire body of federal criminal law two centuries ago .... ).
128. Strazella, supra note 124, at 5. See also Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the
Impact on the Federal Courts, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 39, 40 (1996)
("[Flederal offenses of the time included treason, bribery of federal officials, perjury in federal
court, theft of government property, and revenue fraud. Since the federal government was small
and it conducted few programs, the list of actions classified as offenses for the protection of
federal interests was correspondingly restricted.").
129. Strazzella, supra note 124, at 6.
130. Id.
131. See Brickey, supra note 127, at 28.
132. Id. Indeed, this number may be low. The ABA Task Force noted the difficulty of count-
ing federal crimes, because "there is no conveniently accessible, complete list of federal crimes."
Strazzella, supra note 124, at 9. Criminal sanctions are widely dispersed throughout federal stat-
utory and administrative law; nearly 10,000 federal regulations mention sanctions of either a
criminal or civil nature. Id. at 10 n.l.
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noted that the trend, far from abating, is growing. 133 Over 40% of
federal criminal provisions passed by Congress since the Civil War
were passed in the period since 1970.134 The 105th Congress intro-
duced an estimated 1,000 bills with some connection to criminal
law. 135 The Task Force further noted the concomitant growth in the
size of federal criminal justice services, necessitated by the growing
number of crimes processed in the federal system.136
The ABA Task Force attributed the federalization trend to Con-
gress's "patchwork response" to newsworthy events and the political
popularity of crime legislation. 137 Moreover, there seems to have
been a systemic failure of federalism reflected in the trend: federal
crime legislation passes without meaningful analysis of whether state
and local governments are better equipped to deal with the prob-
lem.138 Much of this legislation overlaps, or even duplicates, existing
state law.139
Having assembled the statistics that document the federalization
trend, the Task Force turned its attention to an analysis of the impact
of this trend on both the federal system 140 and state and local govern-
ments. The Task Force concluded that there was no persuasive evi-
dence that federalizing crime had a demonstrable, significant impact
on public safety.141 The reason for this may be that despite the stag-
geringly increased number of federal crimes, the pursuit of actual fed-
eral prosecutions is still somewhat limited by resource issues.' 4 2 Thus,
"the selection of which crimes to investigate and prosecute therefore
133. Id. at 11.
134. Id. at 7.
135. Id. at 11.
136. Id. at 13. "[B]etween 1982 and 1993, overall federal justice system expenditures in-
creased at twice the rate of comparable state and local expenditures, increasing 317% as com-
pared to 163%." Strazzella, supra note 124, at 14.
137. Id. at 14-15.
138. Id. at 15. Chief Justice Rehnquist has also weighed in on this problem. He has noted, in
reference to recently enacted federal statutes expanding federal jurisdiction, that "the question
of whether the states are doing an adequate job . . . was never seriously asked." William H.
Rehnquist, Address to the American Law Institute, in REMARKS AND ADDRESSES AT THE 75TH
ANNUAL ALl MEETING, MAY 1998, at 18 (1998).
139. Brickey, supra note 127, at 37. See also Philip B. Heymann & Mark H. Moore, The
Federal Role in Dealing with Violent Street Crime: Principles, Questions and Cautions, 543 AN-
NALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 103, 110 (1996) ("Street crimes are accepted as a local re-
sponsibility and state government can readily create the law enforcement advantages enjoyed by
the federal government by simply changing the statutes that define crimes, procedures, and
sentences.").
140. Strazzella, supra note 124, at 35-42.
141. Id. at 18.
142. Id. Federal prosecutions constitute fewer than 5% of all prosecutions in the country. Id.
at 19.
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requires a decisionmaking process which reflects highly selective pri-
oritizing by investigative agencies and federal prosecutors.
1
"
43
This selectivity in federal prosecution, requiring as it does the exer-
cise of federal prosecutorial discretion, 144 yields another potential
concern given the demographic data of the relevant state and federal
jury pools. That is, it raises the possibility that the federal
prosecutorial power could be invoked in order to avoid an expected
outcome in particular state prosecutions based on the expected demo-
graphic makeup of the jury pool."45
The Task Force concluded its study by characterizing the federaliza-
tion trend as troubling. 146 In particular, they expressed deep concern
that local values would be lost in the rush to federalize crime and im-
pose national standards:
Local crimes involve local values and should be handled by state
law. Each state's criminal justice system embodies a series of state
decisions about what conduct should be subjected to governmental
control and criminal sanctions (prison or fine) and about what so-
cially unacceptable conduct should be left outside those criminal
prohibitions (left perhaps to private social pressures, to moral re-
straints, or perhaps to non-criminal suits between individuals or be-
tween governmental agencies and individuals). Community views
also differ from state to state on related issues: the appropriate lim-
its on police investigative practices, acceptable prosecutorial discre-
tion, the locale of trials, suitable court procedures and rules of
evidence, the exact penal consequences that should accompany con-
viction, and the wisest allocation of limited resources to confront
the important problem of crime. In the participatory democracy of
our large nation, with varying local values, citizen views about such
matters are more likely to be felt and acted upon through represent-
atives at the local level, rather than at the federal level where most
of those in power are more removed from the affected local values
and more preoccupied with issues of national and international
concern.
147
Though the Task Force expressed its concern in relation to the com-
munity's role in articulating criminal standards through its elected rep-
143. Id. at 18.
144. The Task Force noted the basically unreviewable discretion of federal prosecutors as to
whether to bring particular prosecutions, and that state prosecutors are usually more directly
accountable to the electorate. Id. at 32-35.
145. Indeed, it is possible that federal death penalty prosecutions are being undertaken pre-
cisely because the states where the crime occurred either do not have the death penalty or are
unlikely to impose it. For example, Michigan does not have a death penalty; federal prosecu-
tions for murder there make the defendant subject to capital punishment in contravention of the
apparent will of the majority of people in Michigan.
146. Strazzella, supra note 124, at 43.
147. Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
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resentatives (that is, legislatively) and thus the direct impact on state
and local governments, its conclusions apply with equal force to the
community's role in giving content to criminal standards through jury
service. In both contexts, more localized community norms are better
expressed through more localized prosecutions.
B. The Implications of a More Localized Understanding of
Community for Drawing a Fair Cross-Section of Jurors
If the community to be represented by the fair cross-section of the
jury is better defined at a more local level, then the concern becomes
the monolithic character of many communities. One thinks immedi-
ately of the nearly all-white jury in Simi Valley, California, that acquit-
ted the police officers who, as all the world knew from the videotape,
had beaten Rodney King. 148 As Putnam notes, communities often
produce negative externalities for those outside their boundaries. Is it
possible to preserve the positive values of local communities without
ensconcing negative ones?
This huge question harkens back to a point long debated by com-
munitarians and liberals as to the normative value of a community's
views. Without purporting to take on that debate here, we can per-
haps escape the conundrum by developing a more nuanced and situa-
tional definition of what "community" (or polity) is relevant for a
particular purpose.' 49 It is fitting that a much larger community-
namely, the state-defines through the criminal code what behavior
148. See Kenneth B. Nunn, Rights Held Hostage: Race, Ideology and the Peremptory Chal-
lenge, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 63 (1993):
In the spring of 1991, a gang of baton-wielding Los Angeles police officers savagely
beat motorist Rodney King at the intersection of Foothill Boulevard and Osborne
Street. By a quirk of fate, a bystander captured the assault on videotape and, within
days, much of the nation became witness to the excesses of the Los Angeles Police
Department. Most Americans reacted with shock and outrage to this apparent police
rampage and the Department's subsequent cover-up attempt. Yet, thirteen months
later, a jury of ten whites, one Latino and one Asian-American returned verdicts of
acquittal on ten of the eleven charges filed against the officers.
Id. at 63 (citing Report of the Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department 7
(July 9, 1991)).
149. Daniel Bell, through his character of the communitarian Anne, approaches the problem
this way:
While I don't think one can appeal to "objective" standards of morality, standards not
dependent on the actual historical processes of societies, there's another possibility-a
universalism rooted in the convergence of people's understanding of certain core moral
propositions. Every society, it seems, has come to accept a bare set of prohibitions-on
murder, deception, betrayal, and gross cruelty-prohibitions which constitute a kind of
minimal and universal moral code.
BELL, supra note 81, at 76.
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will be sanctioned by the criminal process. 50 But where the criminal
code leaves issues to be determined by jury (community) discretion, a
more localized vision of community may better serve the end of af-
firming community values.
Note that this is decidedly not an argument for anything akin to jury
nullification (of which, arguably, the first Rodney King verdict in Simi
Valley is an example). If the criminal code defines aggravated battery
as the use of deadly force on another person, and the evidence shows
that the defendant did that, the jury is not free to ignore either the law
or the evidence. But if the law asks the jury to give content to words
as vague as "mitigating circumstances" that would obviate a death
sentence, the community's values take center stage in the deliberation
process.
Moreover, while concerns about self-interested community action
are real, and are vividly illustrated by such outrages as the first Rod-
ney King verdict, they do not obviate the need for, and indeed the
inevitability of, the community performing its norm-setting func-
tion.151 That is, inevitably some community, acting through some in-
stitutional vehicle, will set moral norms. The project thus becomes a
question of allocating moral questions to the appropriate polity.152
My position is that local communities, charged as they have tradi-
tionally and historically been with the execution of the criminal law,
continue to be the better arbiters of ambiguities within the law. The
federalization trend in criminal law is divesting local communities of
that traditional role, and is doing so at the expense of both community
values and genuine racial diversity in the jury system. For whatever
geographical polity defines the community from which a fair cross-
section of jurors will be drawn will then establish its social norms
through the juries' decisionmaking. And just as gerrymandered politi-
cal districts frequently have the effect of diluting minority voting
150. In The Spirit of Community, Etzioni makes a similar point in his explication of the com-
munitarian agenda: he notes the importance of the "social webs that communities provide, in
neighborhoods, at work, and in ethnic clubs and associations" and that "government needs to
refrain from usurping [the communities' institutional] functions." ETZIONI, supra note 72, at
248. Etzioni further argues that "the national society must ensure that local communities will
not lock in values that we, as a more encompassing and overriding community, abhor[.]" Id.
151. Indeed, American society is replete with examples of local deviation from national
norms-consider the persistence of school prayer in many areas in contravention of the Supreme
Court rulings that such practices violate the First Amendment.
152. Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (Supreme Court struck down, as violative of
national equal protection norms, a Colorado state constitutional amendment adopted by referen-
dum that was designed to undo protections given to gay and lesbian citizens by local governmen-
tal entities).
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power,153 federalized jury districts have the effect of diluting minority
community values that would otherwise be expressed through crimi-
nal juries drawn more locally in state courts.
The key is to understand the local community's function, through
the institution of the criminal jury in individual trials, as giving imme-
diate, fact-based content to the larger community's moral proclama-
tions as expressed in the criminal code. This approach avoids the
potential dangers of separatist local community action (as in the Simi
Valley Rodney King verdict) while preserving the community-
strengthening and legitimating effects of local decisionmaking. The
local jury thus acts as the interpreter and enforcer, in particularized
fact situations, of the supracommunity's more general value judg-
ments. As Etzioni notes, "the more one favors strengthening commu-
nities ... the more one must concern oneself with ensuring that they
see themselves as parts of a more encompassing whole, rather than as
fully independent and antagonistic."'154 He further argues that this
makes it possible for smaller, constituent communities "to follow their
own subsets of values without endangering the body society, as long as
they accept these shared values.' 55 The problem posed by the feder-
alization of criminal juries is that these subsets of values held in mi-
nority communities, though not incompatible with the larger
community's "shared values" as expressed in the criminal code, are in
danger of being subsumed by the larger majority. 156
Indeed, the notion of "constitutive communities" that give content
to one's values may have particular resonance in a minority commu-
nity. Recall that communitarian theory uses community members'
self-identification as a means of identifying community.157 In answer
153. Kim Forde-Mazrui has argued that jurors should no longer be drawn on an at-large basis
from the judicial district that hosts the trial. Rather, courts should subdivide their districts into
"jural districts" in an effort to capture "communities of interest" as that concept has been devel-
oped by the Supreme Court in electoral districting cases. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 1, at 388-95.
Jurors for particular cases would be selected such that each of those districts would be repre-
sented in the petit jury, or at least the venire. In the electoral context, the Supreme Court has
approved the use of race as a factor (though not the sole factor) along with other demographic
characteristics like political affiliation and socioeconomic status, in drawing legislative districts.
Id. at 383-84. This plan would thus promote the representation of minority groups on juries, as
long as the "jural districts" are drawn to capture neighborhoods with a high minority population.
As Professor Forde-Mazrui acknowledges, however, the plan would impose significant adminis-
trative burdens and costs. Id. at 400-03.
154. ETZION1, supra note 72, at 155.
155. Id. at 157.
156. As highlighted earlier, this is akin to the problem of the dilution of minority voting power
by gerrymandering electoral districts. See discussion supra Part II.C.
157. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text (Daniel Bell's discussion of constitutive
communities).
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to the question "who are you?," how many whites in America would
answer "I am white"? Whiteness as an identity is obviated by a soci-
ety that privileges whiteness in countless overt and covert ways.158
But identification with a minority racial or ethnic group is more likely
to be a key component of one's self-understanding in a society that
often oppresses and suppresses that group. Thus, there is arguably an
obligation on the larger supracommunity to arrange its institutions
(such as the jury) in a way that allows expression of values held dear
in minority communities.' 59
C. From Theory to Practice: A Case Study in the Effect of
Federally Diluted Jury Pools
This section addresses the question whether the confluence of the
demographic effect of the federalization of crime with the communi-
tarian and postmodern theory explored above has any real world im-
plications. The case study described in the introduction will serve as a
vehicle to examine that question. Imagine a gun-store robbery/mur-
der allegedly committed by an African-American youth in Philadel-
phia. If the youth is tried in the state court system, his jury will be
drawn from the county of Philadelphia, where the African-American
population constitutes 43.2% of the total population.' 60 If he is
charged under federal law and tried in the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, the African-American population would be 16.8%.
Of course, neither of these figures portends any particular demo-
graphic makeup of the petit jury that will try the case. The question
becomes, then, whether the added probability of having any black jury
members makes a difference. Empirical research indicates that it
does. David Baldus and colleagues studied data on capital juries in
Philadelphia in the years 1984 through 1994.161 Their findings indicate
that "black defendants are treated less punitively vis-A-vis nonblack
defendants as the proportion of blacks on the juries increases.' 162
158. See generally IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF
RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION (2001) (documenting race discrimination effects in con-
texts such as car buying and kidney transplantation).
159. One might even frame an argument that this obligation is analogous to that justifying
remedial measures in cases of de jure discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.
160. See tbl. DP-1 (Philadelphia County, Pa.), supra note 55, available at http://censtats.cen-
sus.gov/data/PA/05042101.pdf.
161. David Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era:
An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REv.
1638 (1998) [hereinafter Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination]. See also David Baldus et al., The
Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 3 (2001) [hereinafter Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges].
162. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination, supra note 161, at 1721 n.159.
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Moreover, as the number of black jurors increases, death sentences
become less likely. 163 Similar findings emerged from the Capital Jury
Project, which is a national study of the decisionmaking of capital ju-
rors, based on interviews with 1,155 capital jurors involved in 340 tri-
als in fourteen different states.164 The study's authors found two
strong impacts of jury racial composition in cases involving black de-
fendants and white victims, which they referred to as the "white male
dominance" effect and the "black male presence" effect. 165
Specifically,
[tihe presence of five or more white males on the jury dramatically
increased the likelihood of a death sentence between .... cases with
four and those with five white male jurors (23.1% vs. 63.2%) ....
[and t]he presence of black male jurors in these B/W cases, by con-
trast, substantially reduced the likelihood of a death sentence.1 66
The addition of one black male juror made a stark statistical differ-
ence: "[i]n the absence of black male jurors, death sentences were im-
posed in 71.9% of the cases, as compared to 42.9% when one black
male was on the jury."'1 67 Significantly, the authors found that these
effects were independent of one another, further intensifying the sta-
tistical disparity. 168
It thus becomes apparent that juror decisionmaking in capital cases
is highly sensitive to the demographic makeup of the jury. Substan-
tively, this is no doubt related to the areas of discretion built into capi-
tal sentencing schemes. For example, Pennsylvania law requires
jurors in capital cases to consider aggravating and mitigating factors in
determining whether the death penalty should be imposed. 169 Many
of the listed statutory factors engage the jurors in a discretionary eval-
uation of highly contextualized conduct. 170 This discretionary space is
163. See Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges, supra note 161.
164. William J. Bowers et al., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of
the Role of Jurors' Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 171, 189 (2001).
Black jurors comprised 9.8% of the entire sample. Id.
165. Id. at 192-93.
166. Id. at 193.
167. Id. "The difference rose to thirty-four points when the comparison was between none
and one or more black male jurors (71.9% vs. 37.5%)." Id.
168. That is, "in the absence of white male dominance, the presence of one black male juror
yielded" an even lower rate of imposition of the death sentence; conversely, the absence of black
male jurors yielded an even higher rate of imposition. Bowers et al., supra note 164, at 193-94.
169. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (2004). Indeed, this is typical of the capital sentencing
schemes of the states that impose the death penalty, and of the federal capital sentencing statute.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3592 (2000).
170. For example, jurors might be called upon to decide whether "[t]he defendant was under
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(e)(2).
Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(2) ("The defendant was under unusual and substantial duress, regardless
of whether the duress was of such a degree as to constitute a defense to the charge.").
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exactly the reason why juries drawn from a fair cross-section of the
relevant community are so important.
V. CONCLUSION
The criminal justice system, understood in its broadest sense to in-
clude the combined law enforcement efforts of both federal and state
governments, relies for its legitimacy on a sense of public investment,
most importantly manifested in the direct community participation of
the criminal jury. The trend toward federalization of crime, particu-
larly street crime, threatens that legitimacy by removing the immedi-
acy of local control and changing the demographics of those called to
serve on juries. And this is not merely a theoretical threat: as I have
demonstrated, federalization in capital cases can possibly, and quite
literally, mean the difference between life and death.
The impact of this apparently gathering trend 171 thus becomes
something akin to the dilution effect observed in voting rights cases.
Just as the minority vote gets diluted in at-large districting schemes,
but can be captured by demographically-sensitive districting, the val-
ues of minority communities are more likely to be subsumed in juries
drawn from larger federal districts than they would be in smaller,
county-based state court juries.
One question worth exploring is whether there is a causal connec-
tion between the federalization of crime and the minority dilution ef-
fect on criminal juries. Regardless, the effect is real, and ought to be a
consideration both for legislators who define crime and officials who
select which prosecutions to pursue. The legitimacy of the criminal
justice system is at stake.
171. See supra Parts IV.A. and IV.C (describing growing trend of federalizing crime).
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APPENDIX A
White Black/African-American Hispanic/Latino
[Vol. 54:79110
80.0% -
70.0% -
60.0% -
50.0% -
40.0% -
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%-
0.0%-
